It is often argued that managers follow some preference function.
Introduction
Firms are run by managers. This is normally true for headquarters as well as the divisions of a …rm. An important task when managing a business is to identify and acquire valuable investments. Managers need to put e¤ort into information gathering and processing to determine new investment opportunities. They also need to be compensated for their e¤ort and given incentives to take decisions in the interest of the …rm's shareholders. The existence of internal capital allocation now might arguably in ‡uence these managerial incentives. In an extreme case, even a perfectly working internal capital market, i.e. ex post optimal resource allocation within a …rm, might destroy value because of distorted managerial incentives (Brusco and Panutzi 2005, Laux and Inderst 2005 ). More precisely, having an internal capital market in place generally in ‡uences managers in one of two ways. On the one hand they are potentially willing to put e¤ort into project acquisition because of the chance of obtaining additional capital (being a winner). On the other, managers might be discouraged and less willing to exert e¤ort because of the possibility of being a loser, i.e. having funds taken away from them, which means they might not be able to realize the identi…ed investment opportunities.
It is often argued that in addition to incentive mechanisms and payment, managers also follow some kind of preference function. In addition to monetary incentives managers might value whether they are running one or numerous projects, the structure of the decisions they have to take (…ring vs. hiring for example) or how others value their work. These private bene…ts play a substantial role when examining the possible value that the internal resource allocation may add and also with regard to the question of how an internal capital market alters managerial incentives. In the literature on internal capital markets managers are usually assumed to behave like empire builders, i.e. it is assumed that they derive increasing private bene…ts with the size or number of the projects that they are running or, equivalently, the funds they are able to invest. These preferences can be rationalized, for example, with increased value given to human capital or managerial concerns with regard to prestige or control bene…ts.
However, there might be alternative preferences which could be plausible. For example Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) state: "Our (empirical) results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life". So, employees might prefer not to face new challenges but to be left in charge of tasks they are happy with. This consequently means that managers will not necessarily try to attract as many projects or funds as possible, i.e. managers may not act as empire builders.
These possibly di¤ering managerial preferences and the competition induced by an internal capital allocation give rise to interesting questions which we analyze in this paper. Competition for (scarce) resources is the constitutive issue for the functioning of an internal capital market. To clearly identify the underlying principles in this respect, we explicitly investigate the e¤ects of introducing competition via capital (re-)allocation within a …rm by considering both empire building managers and those who prefer the quiet life. Secondly, we address the role of monetary incentives. Are optimal salaries di¤erent in regard to managerial preferences? Is their value a¤ected by the presence of an internal capital allocation? These are the questions we analyze.
Empire building (EB) managers have a natural desire to implement more projects and are therefore willing to invest e¤ort to be able to do so. This contrasts sharply with the analysis of managers whose behavior re ‡ects enjoyment of a quiet life (QL). They only react when faced with the threat of losing the current business they are running.
By applying a simple wage scheme we identify the possible role of incentive payment. Wages can be principally used to endorse or override the incentives stemming from private bene…t considerations. We show that the concrete optimal wage is generally di¤erent in regard to managerial preferences and that competition, in our case internal capital (re)allocation, calls for lower incentive payments. One can also argue that with QL preferences managerial incentives are less in ‡uenced by their private bene…ts. For instance managers might only respond to monetary incentives relating to the speci…c size of business they are in charge of. This can be bene…cial for the …rm since it makes managerial action more easily assessable, but it might also be more costly to do so, in growing industries for example, where empire building preferences possibly substitute incentive payments.
Extending our analysis and allowing for heterogeneity yields more detailed results on the e¤ects of alternative managerial preferences in a competitive environment. Allowing for di¤erent investment prospects, more precisely that one department has a greater chance of aquiring a very good project by investing e¤ort, generally lowers optimal wage payments no matter what the underlying managerial preferences. However, the reasons di¤er. With QL, only a manager facing worse investment projects ha a greater incentive to execute e¤ort in competition, whereas with EB private bene…t considerations increase the incentive of all managers to provide e¤ort, regardless of their investment prospects. This is quite intuitive when one recalls the general e¤ects of competition on the di¤erent managers: QL managers are threatened by competition with losing their …nancial endowments, thus producing more e¤ort when facing "better" competitor seems quite natural; EB managers, value the further enhancement of their investment prospects, meaning that the managers with improved investment prospects are also better motivated to provide e¤ort.
We also run our analysis with di¤erent initial …nancial endowments. Having only very little overall capital in the system, no matter how it is initially allocated, generally aligns incentives, so that QL and EB managers may actually have identical incentives to provide e¤ort. This is due to the fact that they all have the same goals; empire building is simply not possible with very scarce resources. The other extreme appears when capital is available for almost every possible investment opportunity. QL managers then need not fear being expropriated anymore and will consequently not provide any e¤ort at all, while EB managers, on the contrary, will have the highest incentives to exert e¤ort since they will most likely be able to actually implement projects they may have located. Probably, the most interesting result in this section is that the managerial incentives may change completely with di¤erent initial …nancial endowments of the departments even at a given overall amount of …nancing. Altering ex ante …nancial endowments might be a valuable instrument to provide managers with appropriate incentives via organizational governance.
In summary, we can state that di¤erent managerial preferences matter quite signi…cantly in the way managers react to incentives mechanisms. Furthermore, we have identi…ed not only the strategic interaction of incentive payment and managerial preference, but also new organizational instruments to implement the desired equilibrium. Altering, initial …nancial endowments in the departments can in ‡uence the decisions made even without changing the overall amount of capital involved. Additionally, …rm restructuring and governance is identi…ed as being a mechanism to induce competition and consequently increase managerial incentives to provide e¤ort.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we introduce the model and run the basic analysis with homogeneous projects. We also investigate herein the potential role of incentive payment. Afterwards, in section 3 we extend our analysis to the case of heterogeneity, considering di¤erent investment and …nancial endowments. We conclude with section 4.
The Model
Assume a …rm with two units of capital that can be invested. Managers who have to identify and realize valuable projects can be employed A manager can in ‡uence the success of projects by providing e¤ort, i.e. by the amount of work he personally invests. More precisely manager i can choose between two di¤erent levels of e¤ort, e i = fe; 0g. Providing no e¤ort will certainly lead to a bad project with output . Conversely, exerting e¤ort e will yield a good project with an output of with probability q and a very good project, which actually is modeled as two good projects, i.e. 2 with probability p. With probability (1 p q) only a bad project can be realized even with e¤ort provision. Additionally we assume > 1 > : So, by investing e¤ort a manager can in ‡uence the investment opportunities of the …rm. The manager's personal e¤ort cost are normalized to e (e¤ort invested) or 0 (no e¤ort).
Following Stein (2002) , we assume that the …rm always invests all internal funds. Furthermore, we implicitly assume throughout the whole analysis that it is always optimal in terms of …rm value maximisation that managers actually provide e¤ort, i.e. the "all provide e¤ort" equilibrium is the desired one. Also, when analyzing the case of competition by introducing an internal capital market, reallocation of funds is only applied when a better project, i.e. instead of , can be realized. All players are assumed to be risk neutral.
As previously explained we focus on managerial preferences. We assume that managers realize di¤erent private bene…ts dependant on the projects realized. With no project running, the private bene…t of a manager is normalized to zero. Having one project realized may yield positive private bene…ts of B 1 , running two projects yields B 2 . With 2 fEB; QLg we di¤erentiate between the empire building (EB) and quiet life (QL) managers.
We hereby model the common assumption empire building in the customary way: private bene…ts increase with the output. So, realizing more projects gives a greater private bene…t to the department manager. To keep things simple, we assume that having executed one project (no matter whether bad or good) provides private bene…ts of B is needed for empire building. The second set of preferences we are interested in is what is called enjoying the quiet life. In this case the manager's greater concern is about being in business, i.e. running his department. Therefore the manager receives a private bene…t if at least one project is executed. The major di¤erence to EB is that it is not per se valuable to him to have a second ongoing project. It might actually even be worse having a lot of projects, since that could interfere with "enjoying the quiet life". However, to keep things simple we distinguish QL from EB by stating that the marginal private bene…ts, in contrast to EB, are zero after a certain point with QL. We therefore assume the following private bene…ts structure for quiet life managers:
With both preference sets we assume that all managers prefer good projects to bad ones as long as they require the same e¤ort from them. Where the relation between B QL and B
is concerned one might argue that the private bene…ts deriving from the …rst project are the same for all managers irrespective of whether they are empire builders or quiet life managers. Such a view is supported by the manager's acceptance by his company and the the good reputation he enjoys for his …rst project. However, another line of argument might be that the private bene…ts of an empire builder from the …rst project are smaller than those of a quiet life manager, which can be one of the reasons why the former tries to attract more than one project. We keep our modeling setup more general at this point, although we will eventually be able to take into account a more detailed setting of private bene…ts structures.
3 The basic trade-o¤s
One manager -no competition
We start our analysis by showing the underlying structures of the model in a simple setup without incentive payment. Putting it another way: what decisions will be taken if managers simply earn a ‡at wage and therefore only try to maximize their private bene…ts? We start our analysis by assuming that one manager is in charge for the whole …rm, i.e. has in principle two units to invest in projects.
A manager who wants to enjoy the quiet life (QL) has no reason to exert any e¤ort if he is always able to implement at least one project, no matter if it is of bad or good quality. So, exactly one bad project will be realized. The manager receives a private bene…t of B QL > 0 for himself which ful…lls the participation constraint normalized to zero. Let us now turn to the case of an empire building manager. In contrast to the case with QL managers, he has an incentive to provide e¤ort. This is due to the fact that EB managers actually care about the number of projects executed and the opportunity of realizing the higher private bene…t B
EB
2 . An EB manager, who does not face an e¤ort-exerting competitor consequently provides e¤ort if the following constraint is ful…lled:
To sum up, a QL manager will never provide e¤ort when left on his own to run the …rm, an EB on the contrary does exert e¤ort when his expected private bene…ts from running two projects are high enough, i.e. (1) is ful…lled. These results are not particularly surprising but yield an interesting reference point for the analysis involving competition.
Two managers -the case of competition
We now introduce the possibility of hiring a second manager. We basically have in mind that the …rm is divided into two departments, each run by a manager. For now we additionally assume that each department is endowed with one unit of capital and that the investment prospects are identical as previously stated. We will look at di¤erent endowments and investment opportunities later on. Additionally, we assume that capital may be reallocated between the departments. However, as stated above, this will only be the case when better investment opportunities can be realized, i.e. capital is taken away from a department when it can only realize a bad project and the other department has identi…ed a very good project.
Having split the …rm into departments without allowing for re-allocation of funds would not not provide any rationale for a better output to the …rm. QL managers still would not provide e¤ort and neither would EB managers, since they were simply not able to realize B EB 2 due to the lack of funds. However, introducing internal capital allocation with a departamental structure, i.e. capital can be transferred from one division to the other, might also yield a rationale for the department managers to execute e¤ort. This stems from the fact that a manager is under threat of not being able to implement even one project. This will be the case when one division has very good investment prospects, i.e. has found two good projects to invest in but the other division has only come up with bad ones. We look at the expected private bene…t structure by considering that the expected bene…t for a manager in competition, E(B ; e i ); depends on the bene…t structure and the e¤ort decision. Consequently the following expected private bene…ts can be realized:
Proposition 1 "All provide e¤ort" (ee) is a Nash-equilibrium with QL managers if the following constraint is ful…lled:
Proof. see the appendix. So, an "all provide e¤ort"-equilibrium becomes possible due to the QL manager's fear of possibly being expropriated. Consequently, hiring a second manager and having them compete for funds gives QL managers a possible reason to exert e¤ort.
EB managers provide e¤ort in competition when (3) is met:
In contrast to the case of QL managers, the e¤ects of competition are not obvious with EB managers. As in the case with only one manager, the department managers are attracted by the possibility of potentially realizing B EB 2 but now are additionally threatened lossing even their initial funding.
Lemma 1 EB managers are indi¤erent, in terms of expected bene…ts from e¤ort provision, whether facing a competitor or not, when the following equation applies:
Proof. see the appendix.
Building on Lemma 1 we can therefore di¤erentiate between two cases.
With 2B
EB managers realize a greater expected bene…t from providing e¤ort when there is a competitor, i.e. (3) is less binding than (1). Therefore being confronted with an e¤ort providing competitor may only induce e¤ort provision in the …rst place. This is the case when (3) 
a competitor actually reduces the bene…ts a manager can expect to gain from e¤ort provision and consequently may even destroy his incentives to provide e¤ort. This is the case when (1) is ful…lled but not (3). One can interprete this …nding in the following way: when the potential bene…t of additional funds is relatively high, i.e. 2B EB 1 > B EB 2 ; theatening them additionally to lose funds does not provide further motivation, on the contrary. Therefore, when this …nancing e¤ect, as we may term it, is accompanied by competition, in the sense that it may also be possible to lose one's own funds, a manager is relatively less motivated. In such a scenario and in contrast to one where there is a relatively low expectation of bene…ts and with QL managers, actually being threatened with competition can be demotivating for EB managers. Introducing competition may therefore negatively a¤ect managerial incentives to provide e¤ort, namely when the expected private bene…ts from two projects are above a given threshold, i.e. 
Incentive payment
We extend our analysis and include the possibility of providing the managers with monetary incentives. In general, monetary incentives are used to induce a desired equilibrium or to put it another way, to destroy an unwanted equilibrium. So, monetary incentives may override or support the incentives stemming from private bene…ts. We are interested in showing the interplay of di¤erent private bene…ts structures and monetary incentives. To keep the analysis simple we assume that incentive contracts can be written on the project output. This leads to forcing contracts, since in the case of a positive output there must have been exertion of e¤ort in the …rst place.
> ;
In the case of one manager running the …rm, i.e. the possibility of …nanc-ing a second project, the wage has to cover the e¤ort costs in expectation to ensure e¤ort provision. With QL managers this is the same as without any preferences at all:
Since a the manager receives the private bene…ts in either case, they do do play a role and one only has to cover the e¤ort costs. This is di¤erent with EB managers: the possibility of receiving a potentially higher private bene…t already increases their incentives. The wage one has to grant in the case of a single EB manager amounts to:
What changes take place when employing two department managers and introducing internal capital allocation? In the case of QL managers the desired "all provide e¤ort" equilibrium can be assured with the following wage contract:
Similarly the expected optimal wage which will induce the desired "all provide e¤ort" equilibrium with EB managers when internal resource allocation is in place amounts to:
Considering (5), (7) and (8) we can state that by introducing competition by the possibility of capital re-allocation and facing an e¤ort-exerting competitor, the optimal wage to implement e¤ort provision falls. Additionally, EB managers may be satis…ed with lower monetary incentives compared to QL managers, i.e. w > w QL > w providing e¤ort is more valuable in terms of private bene…ts when actually facing an e¤ort-exerting competitor. Consequently, the optimal wage w EB c is lower than that without competition, i.e. w EB . Introducing competition to create fear of loss of funds therefore either lowers the needed wage or ensures the desired (ee) equilibrium in the …rst place (see also discussion above). However, this is quite di¤erent with relatively high private bene…ts from additional funds, i.e. 2B may also be costly when the initial manager in charge initially does not provide e¤ort due to private bene…ts. A wage increase of (w EB c w EB ) > 0 must be paid, compared to the case without competition, to induce e¤ort provision by managers in competition. 1 To sum up, competition for funds in internal capital markets lowers the optimal wage to induce e¤ort provision for QL managers as well as for EB managers with relatively high private bene…ts from two projects. However, with relatively high bene…ts from running two projects, i.e. 2B EB 1
< B
EB 2 a manager can be more cheaply motivated without competition.
Heterogeneous projects
So far we have assumed that when having departments in a …rm that they are homogeneous, i.e. they face the same …nancial constraints and have similar investment opportunities. We now extend our analysis and allow for heterogeneity in two di¤erent ways. First, we introduce di¤erent investment opportunities and second we analyze the impact of di¤erent …nancial constraints, i.e. ex ante the departments do not face the same restrictions concerning the potential investment capital. We restrict our analysis in both cases to departemental structures and only refer to a …rm with one manager in charge when additional insight can be gained by doing so.
Di¤erent investment opportunities
We now assume that department g is running its business, for example, in a fast growing market environment and therefore has an increased chance of being able to …nd a very good project when e¤ort is exerted. We model this by allowing for a very good project, i.e. 2 with a higher probability, (p + q). With (1 p q) only a bad project can be realized. However, department b still faces the initial restrictions, i.e. realize 2 with probability p and with probability q.
We now need to di¤erentiate between the department managers, the analysis is no longer symmetrical. E j (B ; e i ) is now the expected bene…t, with j 2 fg; bg. The expected private bene…ts in regard to e¤ort provision are for the g manager as follows:
The expected private bene…ts for the b manager amount to:
By evaluating E j (B QL ; e) > E j (B QL ; 0) we can show, for QL managers, that the g manager, when faced by a competitor of the initial type, experiences the same incentive constraint now as then, i.e. p (p + q) > e (see (2)). However, the b manager, when confronted with a competitor with better investment perspectives (manager g), now can expect higher bene…ts by providing e¤ort, i.e. (p + q) 2 > e.
The di¤erence between homogenous and heteregeneous projects can be demonstrated by the optimal incentive payment changes. While the optimal wage for QL managers with homogenous projects, w QL = e p(p+q)B QL (p+q) still applies for the g manager, it is no longer the case for the b manager. With a lower optimal wage (given positive wages) is su¢ cient to provide an appropriate incentive to exert e¤ort for the b manager. Again, this is due to the fact that the threat of losing his initial capital unit is greater with an improved competitor, which in turn leads to greater expected e¤ort in the …rst place and reduces a possible wage payment to implement the "all provide e¤ort" equilibrium.
Thus, we can state that having departments with di¤erent investment prospects in place relaxes the constraints on providing managers with appropriate incentives. Empirically such a case can be imagined as a merger of two …rms -one with stable investment opportunities and the other a potentially fast-growing …rm. Our model predicts that such a merger would create positive incentives for the manager in charge of the stable enterprise. Putting it di¤erently, reorganizing …rms is an instrument with the potential to induce competition and provide managers with appropriate incentives to exert e¤ort.
How are the incentives of EB managers a¤ected when there are di¤erent investment opportunities in the departments?
Lemma 2 The private bene…ts expected from heterogeneous projects under competition are higher for both EB managers than with homogenous projects. In comparison to (3) the b manager has to gain q(p+q)B EB 1 greater expected bene…ts from providing e¤ort, the g manager q(1 p q)(B
Consequently, the managers …nd e¤ort provision more attractive, or to put it another way, the optimal wages required to induce the "all provide e¤ort" equilibrium can be lower (see discussion for QL managers for similar arguments)
2 .
While the b manager is threatened with a higher probability of losing his initial capital to an improved competitor, the g manager also values his improved prospects of achieving B EB 2 . What empirical relevance may we derive from this analysis? At …rst sight it seems even more desirable than with just QL managers to conduct the merger of a stable with a fast growing …rm (see above) because there is now also a competition e¤ect on the g manager.
Putting it all together, grouping …rms or departments to compete against each other is an interesting organizational way of providing incentives to managers who follow some preference function. It seems most desirable to group departments with di¤erent investment prospects, and especially to let EB managers run departments with good investment prospects and compete against departments with worse prospects run by QL or EB managers, depending on the relation of B QL to the potential private bene…ts of an EB manager. With B QL being relatively low, i.e.
it is optimal (see (2) and (3)) to have an EB manager in charge of the department with the worse investment prospects. However, with relatively high private bene…ts for the QL manager to lose, i.e. B QL > B EB 2 one ideally wants a QL manager to run the department with the worse prospects and providing optimal motivation for both, the QL manager who faces a greater threat of being expropriated and the EB manager who values the good investment prospects most. More generally, one could meet asymmetric investment opportunities with di¤erent managerial preferences.
Di¤erent …nancial endowments
We now turn to the second case of heterogeneity. Here we assume that with similar investment opportunities one of the divisions has a higher initial endowment of …nancial resources. Nevertheless, we stick to the assumption used throughout our analysis, that capital will be only reallocated ex post if there is a better project to realize. In terms of expected bene…ts we note E k (B ; e i ) with k = fh; lg standing for the department with high …nancial resources (h), and (l) for the one with low initial …nancial resources. We will take a look at di¤erent …nancial structures by adding numbers to h and l representing the actual number of …nancing units in the particular department, e.g. h3 means that department is the one with more …nancial resources and that the actual number of …nancing units is three.
To keep the analysis clear we do not di¤erentiate in regard to B EB 2 with EB managers but assume that competition is always optimal, i.e. B The …rst case we analyze is (h1l0). Managers face the following expected bene…ts:
There is no reason for the h manager to exert e¤ort when the l manager does not also provide e¤ort. More precisely, the situation of a h manager is similar to a single-manager …rm. As we have shown a QL manager would never exert e¤ort in such a case However, in contrast to the standard case with two units of funding an Eb also would not provide e¤ort: he due to the lack of funds he simply can never realize B EB 2 and will therefore also not provide e¤ort due to private bene…ts. However, no e¤ort at all is not always an equilibrium in a departamental …rm since it is optimal for to exert e¤ort with E l0 (B ; e) = (p + q)B 1 e > 0: Facing an e¤ort-exerting competitor, it can also be optimal for h to invest e¤ort: although his possible bene…ts are lower, i.e. (p + q) 2 B 1 e > 0 resulting from
Additionally, one needs to account for the incentives of l to provide e¤ort in competition. This is only the case when
Summarizing, we now face a situation in which three equilibria become possible due to private bene…t consideration alone: (ee), (00) or e¤ort only by the manager with the low budget. Combining these results we can state that (ee) is possibly an equilibrium if
With e¤ort cost greater than either of the expected bene…ts, but smaller than (p+q)B; only the l manager will invest e¤ort in equilibrium. If e is even greater than this, no one will provide e¤ort. The analysis is independent of the actual managerial preferences.
Consequently we can state, that managerial preferences do only matter in the case of (h1l0) when B QL 6 = B EB . Having a total of only one unit of capital to allocate leaves no room for gaining higher bene…ts B 2 from expansion, so every manager is only interested in getting the basic bene…t
We now take a look at a second case with (h2l0). The three equilibria given above are still generally possible. Considering QL managers, nothing changes if (p+q)B QL < e, i.e. no e¤ort at all is still the equilibrium. However, the constraint for (ee) being an equilibrium output changes to
By comparing (9) and (10) in the case of QL managers one realizes that the e¤ort costs for (h2l0) will always be lower than for (h1l0). This is due to the fact that capital is less scarce and therefore both managers realize higher expected private bene…ts per se. This raises the opportunity cost of exerting e¤ort and makes it generally less pro…table. Now let us take a look at the bene…ts expected by EB managers in this second case: an equilibrium with competition is given due to private bene…ts if
e > 0 are both ful…lled. This leads to the following constraint which is structurally comparable to the one for QL managers:
By assuming a department with three or more units of …nancing, e.g. the third case with h3l0, we get the result that a QL department manager h never has any incentives to provide e¤ort, regardless of the l manager's e¤ort choice: it is always optimal not to exert e¤ort. This is the case because there is no danger for him of ever losing his private bene…t B QL since he will be able to keep at least one unit of …nancing in any case. Therefore one can treat l as being a single manager without initial funding, i.e. he only invests e¤ort if (p + q)B QL > e.
The situation is slightly more complicated with EB managers. There will also be a dominant strategy for l, but it is not necessarily that of not providing e¤ort. The h manager will provide e¤ort if p(B EB 2 B EB 1 ) > e, which is exactly the same constraint as with a single-manager …rm, i.e. (1). The l manager will not receive any private bene…ts if he does not provide e¤ort. The incentives for an l manager to exert e¤ort while facing an e¤ort-exerting h manager are. E lo (B ; e) = p(1 p)B 
We complete our analysis of di¤erent …nancial endowments by taking a look at the case of (h2l1). In comparison to the basic setup we have one department with an additional unit of capital, and in contrast to every case above, even the l manager possesses ex ante at least one unit of …nancing. With QL managers the additional unit of capital has no in ‡uence on the equilibrium output at all. For every manager the dominant strategy is not to invest e¤ort. This is again due to the fact that there is no real threat of not being able to implement at least one project and realizing the private bene…t B QL . Investing e¤ort can therefore never be rational in terms of private bene…ts since there is nothing to gain from the individual manager's point of view. The picture is not that clear with EB managers. For the h manager, similarly to the (h3l0) case, the decision to provide e¤ort does not depend on the actions of the l manager. Actually he faces exactly the same trade-o¤ and invests e¤ort only if p(B EB 2 B EB 1 ) > e. However, the situation changes most signi…cantly for the l manager when he does not invest e¤ort. In contrast to the above case he will now receive the private bene…t B To sum up, it would be better for QL managers to receive less ex ante funds while EB managers can generally be motivated with higher initial …-nancing, up to a point. This is due to the fact that QL managers only react to threats while the EB managers also greatly value the possibility of making more investments which they can possibly even …nance on their own.
Concluding remarks
Recent empirical evidence, e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) points out that managers might prefer to enjoy the quiet life rather than building empires. By explicitly considering both kinds of managerial preferences we investigated the competition e¤ects induced by internal capital resource allocation. In so doing we identify that changes in the preference function of managers lead to quite di¤erent competition e¤ects. While the incentives of QL managers to invest e¤ort are induced by the threat of losing their ongoing business, EB managers are also positively motivated by the chance to receive additional capital. These di¤erent mechanisms for motivating managers have signi…cant e¤ects on how to use potential instruments to adapt their incentives.
We have identi…ed and discussed two ways of motivating managers through organizational changes. First, one could restructure …rms, for example by merging high and low growth divisions. While this might be a quite valuable instrument to induce competition with QL managers, it is even more appealing when EB managers are in charge. This is due to the fact that while for QL managers only the threat of facing stronger competitors matters, EB mangers also value the possibility of potentially investing more funds. Alternatively, headquarters may consider not only reallocating capital ex post but also the ex ante endowments of several divisions to create positive incentives for e¤ort exertion. The use of this instrument is again very di¤erent with regard to managerial preferences. While EB managers tend to invest more effort with greater …nancial endowments, QL managers tend to react to lower …nancial endowments with greater e¤ort provision. Furthermore, we have shown that optimal incentive payments are generally lower if competition exists but di¤erent in regard to managerial preferences.
To the best of our knowledge this is the …rst paper to address di¤erent managerial preferences in a formal organizational model on internal capital markets. Therefore several issues might be worth addressing in future research. For example, the model could be extended to more explicitly address interaction between EB and QL managers within one organization. One can imagine a labor market where managers and …rms are matched endogenously. It may also be worthwhile to develop testable implications and provide a more detailed empirical analysis of our results. This in turn may lead to further insights regarding the in ‡uence of managerial preferences on competition and eventually on the governance of …rms. 
